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    <title>CWE-16 on guy@secdev.uk</title>
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    <copyright>Guy Dixon | guy@secdev.uk</copyright>
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      <title>Security Misconfiguration</title>
      <link>https://www.secdev.uk/blog/technology/2025-03-29-security-misconfiguration/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 29 Mar 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security misconfiguration is the vulnerability class that really drove home for me why secure defaults matter more than secure documentation. OWASP A05 covers the gap between what a framework &lt;em&gt;can&lt;/em&gt; do securely and how developers actually configure it. Debug mode left on in production. CORS wide open. XML parsers that resolve external entities. Settings endpoints with no authentication. These aren&amp;rsquo;t coding mistakes, they&amp;rsquo;re configuration mistakes, and they show up everywhere. In this post I&amp;rsquo;ll walk through Python, Java, Go, and JavaScript examples covering CWE-16 (Improper Configuration) and CWE-611 (XML External Entity Processing), from the flags that any reviewer would catch to the subtle combinations that can survive months in production.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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