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    <title>Format String on guy@secdev.uk</title>
    <link>https://www.secdev.uk/blog/tags/format-string/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Format String on guy@secdev.uk</description>
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    <copyright>Guy Dixon | guy@secdev.uk</copyright>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>String Formatting and Security: A Cross-Language Minefield</title>
      <link>https://www.secdev.uk/blog/technology/2026-01-03-string-formatting-and-security/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 03 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.secdev.uk/blog/technology/2026-01-03-string-formatting-and-security/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;String formatting is one of those operations that&amp;rsquo;s everywhere, and it&amp;rsquo;s more dangerous than most developers realise when user input gets involved. Every language provides multiple ways to build strings from dynamic data, and each mechanism carries different security implications. From C&amp;rsquo;s &lt;code&gt;printf&lt;/code&gt; family, where a format string bug can read and write arbitrary memory, to Python&amp;rsquo;s f-strings that can execute attribute lookups, the attack surface is broader than most people think. I wanted to map out the full landscape across languages, and what I found was that each mechanism breaks down in its own unique and sometimes surprising way.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>C Security: Manual Memory Management and Its Consequences</title>
      <link>https://www.secdev.uk/blog/technology/2025-10-25-c-security-manual-memory-management/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 25 Oct 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.secdev.uk/blog/technology/2025-10-25-c-security-manual-memory-management/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;C gives you direct control over memory allocation, pointer arithmetic, and hardware interaction. I respect that. But that control comes with absolutely no safety net: no bounds checking, no garbage collection, no type safety beyond what you enforce manually. Every buffer overflow, use-after-free, double-free, format string vulnerability, and null pointer dereference in C is a direct consequence of this design. C remains the language of operating systems, embedded systems, and performance-critical libraries, so its security pitfalls affect every layer of the software stack. When I started digging into the patterns behind C vulnerabilities, the same shapes kept appearing, from the textbook &lt;code&gt;strcpy&lt;/code&gt; overflow to the subtle integer promotion that bypasses a bounds check. Let me walk through them.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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