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    <title>Server-Side Request Forgery on guy@secdev.uk</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Server-Side Request Forgery on guy@secdev.uk</description>
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    <copyright>Guy Dixon | guy@secdev.uk</copyright>
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      <title>SSRF</title>
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      <pubDate>Sat, 07 Jun 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;Server-Side Request Forgery is one of those vulnerability classes that I&amp;rsquo;ve grown to respect more and more the deeper I dig into it. The idea is simple, you trick a server into making HTTP requests to destinations you choose, turning it into your personal proxy. It can reach internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, and private networks that you&amp;rsquo;d never touch directly from the outside. OWASP gave SSRF its own category (A10) in 2021, and reading through the rationale, it was overdue. The case studies are striking, a single SSRF against &lt;code&gt;http://169.254.169.254/&lt;/code&gt; on AWS can leak IAM credentials and compromise an entire account. In this post, I&amp;rsquo;ll walk through Python, Java, Go, and JavaScript examples, from the textbook URL-in-a-parameter to the subtle redirect-chain and DNS rebinding variants that make SSRF so hard to defend against.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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